Extended Deterrence and Communicating Resolve; Strategic Insights, v. 8, issue 5 (December 2009) by Action, James M.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive




Insights, v. 8, issue 5 (December 2009)
Action, James M.
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Strategic Insights, V. 8 (December 2009)
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/11085
 Extended Deterrence and Communicating Resolve 
Strategic Insights, Volume VIII, Issue 5 (December 2009) 
By James M. Acton, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
Strategic Insights is a quarterly electronic journal produced by the Center for Contemporary 
Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. The views expressed 
here are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of NPS, the 
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Introduction: The Curious Case of TLAM-N 
American thinking about extended deterrence has always tended to focus on its nuclear-weapon 
capabilities.[1] It is no different today. The Strategic Posture Commission of the United States—a 
bipartisan commission appointed by Congress ‘to examine and make recommendations with 
respect to the long-term strategic posture of the United States’—reached the following conclusion 
on the requirements needed to fulfill U.S. security guarantees to Japan: 
In Asia, extended deterrence relies heavily on the deployment of nuclear cruise missiles on some 
Los Angeles class attack submarines—the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile/Nuclear (TLAM/N). 
This capability will be retired in 2013 unless steps are taken to maintain it. U.S. allies in Asia are 
not integrated in the same way into nuclear planning and have not been asked to make 
commitments to delivery systems. In our work as a Commission it has become clear to us that 
some U.S. allies in Asia would be very concerned by TLAM/N retirement.[2] 
To say that extended deterrence in Asia relies on the deployment of TLAM/N is odd. For 18 years 
not a single U.S. attack submarine has set sail with nuclear-armed Tomahawk missiles on board. 
Since 1991, when Presidents Bush and Gorbachev announced coordinated initiatives to withdraw 
deployed tactical nuclear weapons, the entire TLAM/N force has been in storage.[3] 
Moreover, the failure rate of conventionally-armed Tomahawk missiles was over 1% in the 2003 
Gulf War.[4] Even if the nuclear-armed variant has a similar failure rate (and, in fact, it is almost 
certainly higher given its older guidance system) it is highly unlikely the U.S. military would use it 
in any future conflict.[5] It is hard to see, therefore, what contribution the TLAM/N force has made 
in the last two decades, or could make in the future, to deterring China or North Korea. 
Supporters of maintaining TLAM/N (including at least some members of the Strategic Posture 
Commission) argue, however, that this analysis misses the point. They make two arguments for 
TLAM/N. They argue that although it plays no role in deterring adversaries it is useful for assuring 
allies and, secondarily, for signaling.[6] 
The key argument for maintaining TLAM/N is to provide evidence of the United States’ 
commitment towards Japan and hence assure—that is, provide psychological comfort to—Tokyo. 
Those who make this argument point both to the symbolism of maintaining a nuclear weapon 
system that would otherwise be scrapped and the fact that nuclear-armed submarines can be 
deployed in close proximity to Japan. 
This argument does, however, not stand up to scrutiny. Ultimately, a nuclear capability will only 
effectively assure Japan if it enhances deterrence. Putting aside the issue of signaling, which is 
discussed below, few argue that TLAM/N adds to deterrence (not least because the U.S. has air-
launched cruise missiles with substantially similar military characteristics).[7] Rather, proponents 
of TLAM/N explicitly acknowledge that the issue is whether Japan believes the U.S. has the 
resolve to defend it (or, perhaps, whether Japan believes that China and North Korea recognize 
U.S. resolve). Maintaining TLAM/N would do nothing to address this concern. The credibility of 
any deterrent threat is, as Thomas Schelling argued, related to the costs incurred by the deterrer 
if its threat is ignored and it fails to act.[8] If China, say, were to commit an act of aggression 
against Japan that was serious enough to merit a nuclear response, the political (and other) costs 
to the United States of failing to act would be the same whether TLAM/N were maintained or not. 
Whether Japanese officials recognize this problem today, the reality is that a decision to maintain 
TLAM/N is unlikely to have a significant, lasting effect on assurance. Rather, Japan would, sooner 
rather than later, simply shift to asking the United States for the next item on its shopping list of 
desired capabilities.[9] This quest for reassurance will continue endlessly unless the fundamental 
issue—the ‘resolve problem’—is addressed head on. 
In addition to assurance, another purported purpose of TLAM/N is signaling: in a crisis, the U.S. 
could redeploy this system to signal its resolve to an aggressor. Given the availability of plenty of 
other signaling options, this would seem an insufficient reason to maintain TLAM/N, even if it 
were suited for signaling. However, it is ill-suited to the task. Signaling is hard and signals are 
prone to be misinterpreted. This problem is exacerbated in the case of TLAM/N because its 
unacceptably high failure rate would probably preclude its use—a fact that it is surely prudent to 
assume China and North Korea are aware of. Signals sent using TLAM/N, therefore, risk being 
interpreted as bluffs indicating a lack of U.S. resolve. The U.S. President should, therefore, 
eschew the use of TLAM/N for signaling. 
The TLAM/N saga is not unusual. It is a typical example of the problem of extended deterrence. 
During the Cold War, for example, the United States deployed numerous systems to Europe—
including different types of B61 gravity bombs, three ballistic missiles (Thor, Jupiter and 
Pershing), a ground-launched cruise missile (Gryphon) and a broad array of nuclear artillery 
systems—yet these rarely, if ever, made a lasting, appreciable difference to the anxiety levels of 
European leaders. Certainly, they never addressed, at a fundamental level, European leaders’ 
fears of abandonment by the United States. 
This paper explores the question of how the United States can convince allies of its resolve—both 
now and in the future. 
Why Do Allies Question U.S. Resolve? 
Conventional military action—let alone nuclear weapons—has little role to play in combating most 
of the security threats faced by U.S. allies today. Threatening nuclear use in response to a cyber 
attack on an ally is simply not credible. Similarly, military capabilities do not appear to have any 
relevance to deterring a Russian cut-off of the gas supply to U.S, allies, or, in the event that 
deterrence fails (as it frequently does in this case), to compelling Russia to re-instate supply. One 
key task, therefore, for the United States and its allies is to develop credible plans for preventing 
and combating the spectrum of threats for which a nuclear response would not be justified, 
especially those for which there is no military solution.[10] 
The only scenarios in which nuclear deterrence might be relevant are those in which the very 
existence of an ally is under threat. In addition, therefore, to developing strategies for combating 
threats below the nuclear and military thresholds, the United States is faced with the second 
important task of assuring its allies that it will, if necessary, use nuclear weapons when their 
national survival is at stake. This second task is the focus of this paper. 
It is not hard to see why allies might doubt U.S. resolve. The use of nuclear weapons would 
probably invite a response in kind 3that could kill literally millions of Americans. Allies realize that 
this would, at the very least, give the President pause. In the case of Japan, China’s (slowly) 
growing ability to hold U.S. cities at risk exacerbates this fear. 
Moreover, since the end of the Cold War, important political and economic changes are leading 
allies to ask themselves whether their security really is indivisible from that of the United States. 
Consider the problem from a Japanese perspective. Over the last decade or so, Sino-U.S. 
relations have been steadily improving. Most importantly, perhaps, China is now a much more 
important trading partner for the U.S. than Japan. In 2000, Japanese exports to the U.S. 
exceeded Chinese exports by $46 billion. In 2008, Chinese exports exceeded those from Japan 
by $199 billion.[11] This increasing economic interdependence raises the cost of a U.S.-China 
conflict to both parties (even while making such a conflict less likely). Observing this trend, it is 
understandable if Japan, in gaming out a possible future conflict with China, asks itself whether it 
really would be in the American national interest to defend Japan with all available means. 
The case of Japan throws the challenge of assuring allies into sharpest relief. But, it is a generic 
problem. Allies will not be assured automatically; extensive American diplomatic energies will 
always be required. 
In response to this challenge, the United States has deliberately tried to conflate resolve and 
capabilities in allies’ minds in an attempt to demonstrate U.S. resolve through the provision of 
particular capabilities. In the Foreword to the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, for example, then 
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld wrote: 
Terrorists or rogue states armed with weapons of mass destruction will likely test America's 
security commitments to its allies and friends. In response, we will need a range of capabilities to 
assure friend and foe alike of U.S. resolve.[12] 
This strategy could be successful only if the United States were able to develop and deploy 
effective damage limitation capabilities. In this very special case, U.S. resolve to retaliate with 
nuclear weapons on behalf of an ally would be enhanced because adversaries would not be able 
exact unacceptable damage on the United States in response. The requirements for meaningful 
damage limitation are extremely demanding: effective real-time surveillance to locate enemy 
nuclear forces (especially mobile missiles), a command and control system capable of adapting 
targeting plans quickly in response to surveillance data, a large arsenal of highly accurate 
weapons (both conventional and nuclear) to enable effective counterforce strikes, and an 
effective missile defense system to ‘mop up’ any surviving enemy weapons. Indeed, some have 
argued that the development of American counterforce capabilities was driven primarily by desire 
to limit damage in an attempt to make the extended deterrence mission more credible.[13] 
There is only one important metric in assessing whether damage limitation capabilities are 
‘effective’: whether they could plausibly change the deterrence calculus for an adversary. U.S. 
adversaries fully realize that for an elected U.S. President (the ultimate nuclear weapon decision 
maker in the United States), unacceptable damage in defending an ally is almost certainly one 
nuclear weapon on one major city. (This is, of course, why Chinese analysts are fond of asking 
whether the United States would swap Taiwan for Los Angeles.) Even with much better damage 
limitation capabilities than it currently possesses, the United States could not realistically hope to 
eliminate China’s ability to inflict even this ‘modest’ level of damage. In the case of Russia, the 
likely scale of damage would be orders of magnitude larger. This reality renders the pursuit of 
strategically-meaningful damage limitation capabilities futile.[14] 
Against this background, the U.S. strategy of demonstrating resolve through capabilities, in 
practice, boils down to pointing to certain nuclear weapons as symbols of American resolve. The 
attractions of trying to demonstrate resolve in this way are obvious. Resolve is abstract and hard 
to demonstrate convincingly. Capabilities are concrete and easy to flaunt. If the U.S. promises to 
develop or maintain some particular capability for the sake of extended deterrence, allies have 
something tangible they can take back home. They also have no difficulty assessing whether the 
U.S. has actually followed through on a promise about capabilities. The truth of American 
statements about its resolve to defend allies cannot be tested so straightforwardly—at least not 
short of a severe crisis. Naturally, an ally does not want to enter such a crisis uncertain about 
whether the U.S. has its back. 
It is, therefore, very tempting for the United States to try and demonstrate resolve through 
capabilities. Unfortunately, this strategy has proven nothing more than a temporary expedient. It 
causes allies to fixate on capabilities and risks them constantly asking for more. Worse still, if the 
U.S. tries to withdraw some moribund capability with which it has previously sought to 
demonstrate resolve, allies are likely to start questioning the United States’ commitment. 
This is precisely what happened with Japan and TLAM/N. During the 2001 Nuclear Posture 
Review, the Bush Administration apparently informed the Japanese government that TLAM/N 
was being preserved especially for Japan’s benefit. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that 
discussions about the withdrawal of TLAM/N worry Japan. 
The U.S. needs a new strategy for communicating resolve that does not rely on the provision of 
capabilities. Indeed, the U.S. should seek to disentangle the concepts of resolve and capabilities 
in allies’ minds. 
Does the U.S. Have Sufficient Resolve to Make Extended Deterrence Credible? 
Before considering what such a strategy might entail, it is worth asking the fundamental question 
of whether the U.S. does have enough resolve to make extended deterrence credible. After all, if 
nuclear retaliation on behalf of ally would lead to the U.S. incurring unacceptable damage, could 
a strategy of communicating resolve ever succeed? 
Fortunately, it can because extended deterrence, like deterrence more generally, does not 
require certainty of retaliation. 
First, an enemy considering threatening the existence of a U.S. ally must factor in the possibility 
that the U.S. would use nuclear weapons because the President judged that the threat to the ally 
also constituted an existential threat to the United States. This adds to the credibility of extended 
nuclear deterrence. It is enhanced further by the symmetrical, but frequently forgotten nature, of 
the ‘resolve problem’. Just as a U.S. President would probably not sacrifice New York in the 
defense of Tokyo, so the Chinese leadership would probably not be willing to risk Beijing (and 
much else besides) to acquire it. This promotes the same extreme caution in Chinese decision 
makers contemplating an action that might incur a nuclear response as it does in their American 
counterparts. 
Second, even if an enemy could somehow discount the possibility of a direct U.S. nuclear 
response, it could certainly not ignore the possibility of a conventional response. Even besides 
the deterrence value of a conventional war with the U.S., such a conflict could escalate—through 
design, miscalculation or accident—to a nuclear one. This possibility—Schelling’s "threat that 
leaves something to chance"[15]—also adds credibility to extended nuclear deterrence. Its effect 
does not dependent greatly on the size or composition of the U.S. arsenal. 
Admittedly, allies would probably find these lines of reasoning cold comfort. Yet, they are more 
credible than the attempt to make extended nuclear deterrence plausible by damage limitation 
capabilities or of allies "going it alone" by procuring their own nuclear weapons and, in the 
process, forsaking the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Taking advantage of this the U.S. should seek to 
emphasize that its resolve is fit for purpose. 
Demonstrating Resolve 
Demonstrating resolve will require effort and creativity. But it is not impossible. Many analysts 
have argued recently about the importance of allies "not read[ing] in the newspaper about any 
changes in the American nuclear posture."[16] Avoiding this by waking foreign leaders in the 
middle of the night to inform them of important changes in missile defense policy is hardly much 
of an improvement.[17] 
In contrast, genuine consultations—before decisions are made—could help to demonstrate 
resolve by indicating to allies that they are important enough to be included in the U.S. planning 
process.[18] Just as importantly, it could also be a useful forum for disentangling the concepts of 
resolve and capabilities. 
While dialogue and consultation are important, there is also no reason to suppose that a one-
size-fits-all approach will be effective. Different approaches may be required to convince different 
allies of U.S. resolve. There is no reason why what convinces Estonia of American resolve would 
also convince Taiwan or, in the future perhaps, Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates. 
For this reason, regional specialists—with extensive knowledge of allies’ culture—should be 
engaged. They should be tasked with developing a strategy for communicating resolve. Are 
public or private statements of resolve more convincing? To whom should such statements be 
given? Should they be delivered by civilian or military leaders? How often should they be 
repeated? What words should be used? Where should they be delivered? 
Beyond words, what practical steps could the U.S. take to convincingly and acceptably 
demonstrate resolve? Such steps should curtail its option not to act if an ally is attacked. 
Stationing troops on an ally’s soil to act as a tripwire is an obvious possibility.[19] But what about 
cultural or educational exchanges? Or even increased tourism? Such steps could help to create a 
tripwire without the need to station more troops abroad. More generally, anything that ties the 
U.S. to its allies—enhanced trade, greater military cooperation or strengthened cultural links—
makes defending allies more in the U.S. interest and hence communicates resolve. 
The United States should expect its allies to be more active partners. In particular, the U.S. 
should ask them what kind of demonstrations they would find convincing; and it should press 
them for a full and detailed answer. Like a good marriage, effective extended deterrence requires 
the continued efforts of both parties. 
Just as important as taking steps to enhance the perception of U.S. resolve is to curtail, as far as 
possible, actions that undermine it 
Most importantly, the United States needs to become much more sensitive to the way that its 
domestic dialogue can affect extended deterrence. For example, American interest in Middle East 
oil is one factor that ties U.S. security to the security of friendly states in the Gulf. It should come 
as no surprise, therefore, that at a recent conference one participant from a Gulf state remarked 
that every time a U.S. official talks about energy independence, his confidence in the U.S. 
commitment to his state’s security is undermined. Naturally, energy policy—as well as policy on 
China, Russia, Iran or North Korea—is determined by many more factors than extended 
deterrence. But, extended deterrence should be weighed into the broader calculus. 
Another factor to be considered is how existing allies will respond to the provision of new security 
guarantees. The problem is most acute in the context of possible future NATO expansion. The 
United States offers the same security guarantee—Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty—to all 
member states. If NATO is expanded to new states, which it is not obviously in the U.S. interest 
to defend with all available means, then existing NATO members might worry even more about 
U.S. resolve. The effect on existing security guarantees must be weighed into the decision about 
whether to extend new ones. 
Extended Deterrence and Disarmament 
Extended deterrence has become the argument par excellence against President Obama’s stated 
goal of a world without nuclear weapons.[20] If the credibility of extended deterrence really did 
depend upon the size and diversity of American nuclear forces then alliance commitments could 
be a strong reason for caution in pursuing disarmament. However, if resolve is actually the key, 
then, at least in the medium term, disarmament can be reconciled with extended deterrence. 
Because the concepts of resolve and capabilities have become conflated in allies’ minds, 
contemporary U.S. doctrine calls for more nuclear weapons than are necessary for deterring or 
responding to existential threats as well as the maintenance of moribund capabilities that "appear 
to have nothing to do with the possible demands of 'warfighting,' but are important for the 
psychological/political goal of allied assurance."[21] As argued in this paper, a more sensible 
approach to assurance is disentangling resolve from capabilities, and finding other, more effective 
ways to communicate resolve. If successful, this strategy would enable the United States to 
reduce its arsenal, withdraw weapons from Europe and scrap TLAM/N without sparking a crisis of 
confidence among its allies. 
Of course, if the U.S. were to dismantle capabilities that are genuinely required for deterrence 
then allies would have reason to worry. Until underlying conflicts are resolved or durably 
stabilized and a robust collective security architecture capable of protecting states’ vital interests 
is created, nuclear deterrence will continue to play some role and this will impose a limit to 
reductions.[22] Quite where this limit is can be debated, but most would accept it is far below 
today’s force levels, if the U.S, no longer relied on the size of its arsenal for assurance or 
dissuasion.[23] What is clear is that this floor depends, in part, on the willingness of all other 
nuclear-armed states to join the reductions process (once the U.S. and Russia have reduced to a 
level where it makes sense to include them). 
Disagreement would come from those who believe that for extended deterrence to be credible the 
United States must have effective damage limitation capabilities. In particular, Japanese officials 
frequently, but privately, voice concerns about the U.S. reducing to below 1,000 warheads. To the 
extent that these fears have a clear foundation, it appears to be related to the effect of reductions 
on the feasibility of damage limitation. This argument might be valid if the U.S. currently had 
effective damage limitation capabilities. However, as discussed above, the United States would 
incur unacceptable damage today in a nuclear war with China in the defense of Japan. 
Complaining that effective damage limitation will not be possible if the U.S. arsenal was reduced 
to below 1,000 warheads, while true, is therefore beside the point; it is not an argument against 
deep reductions. 
Conclusions 
The key to extended nuclear deterrence—both now and in the future—is effectively 
communicating U.S. resolve. To date, the United States has tried to accomplish this by 
designating certain capabilities (such as TLAM/N) as symbols of U.S. resolve. It has not worked 
well. A new strategy for communicating resolve is required. Here are five lessons, extracted from 
the preceding analysis, that policy makers could bear in mind when formulating it. 
1. Accept that effective extended deterrence relies as much on culture as capabilities. A 
strategy for communicating resolve needs to be tailored to each ally and should be 
developed in consultation with regional specialists who understand how to make 
demonstrations of U.S. resolve persuasive.  
2. Consult with allies before decisions affecting them are taken. When initiating new security 
guarantees, set up mechanisms for such consultation right from the outset. Use such 
consultations to force allies to think through how the U.S. could convincingly 
demonstrate its resolve—and listen to them.  
3. Educate allies in nuclear strategy and aim to disentangle the concepts of capabilities and 
resolve.  
4. Be aware of how the U.S. domestic dialogue can undermine perceptions of U.S. resolve.  
5. Be realistic from the start about the highly limited set of circumstances in which nuclear 
weapons are useful. 
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. 
To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox, please email ccc@nps.edu 
with subject line "Subscribe." There is no charge, and your address will be used for no other 
purpose. 
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